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FINDING THE GROOVE: TERMINATIONS OF SOUND RECORDING TRANSFERS
I.	INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 2013, authors who transferred ownership of their copyright in
works created after January 1, 1978 will be able to terminate those transfers and
renegotiate more favorable terms.1 As the recording industry struggles to reverse the
loss of billions of dollars in lost sales due to illegal online file sharing, there is likely
to be contentious litigation between artists seeking to reclaim their rights and labels
intent on maintaining ownership and control of their catalogs.2
Terminations of sound recordings transfers present two particularly knotty legal
issues that are likely to be the focus of this costly, high-stakes litigation. Since transfers
of “works made for hire” are statutorily ineligible for termination, the first issue is
whether or not a given sound recording is a “work made for hire.” The second issue is
how to identify the author of a sound recording. This is a critical question because
only authors are eligible to terminate copyright transfers, and yet the Copyright Act
(the “Act”) does not define who is the author of a sound recording.
This note seeks to identify the appropriate doctrinal analysis of these issues, as
well as to develop a pragmatic approach for resolving disputes relating to sound
recording terminations more generally. As a starting point, I propose that the
ultimate measure of any proposal in this area ought to be whether it advances the
underlying mission of copyright law derived from the Constitution: designing
economic incentives for authors and publishers (in this context, artists and record
companies) that are most likely to maximize the creation of new works and enhance
public access to those works.3 More specifically, I suggest that the issues surrounding
sound recording terminations be considered with an eye towards creating properly
calibrated incentives that fuel an ecosystem in which recorded music is created and
flows to consumers efficiently and for a reasonable price.
I offer a three-prong approach. First, courts considering challenges to terminations
of sound recording transfers should find that, in most cases, sound recordings are not
works made for hire, and that artists are “authors” eligible to invoke termination
rights. Second, Congress should amend the Act to clarify the meaning of “work made
for hire” and to define authors of sound recordings as “key contributors.” Third, in
order to avoid costly litigation with unpredictable results, a Music Industry Working
Group on Terminations should be established as a means for advancing a voluntary,
cooperative effort to facilitate fair, efficient resolution of most termination claims.
1.

See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); Daniel Gould, Time’s Up: Copyright Termination,
Work-For-Hire and the Recording Industry, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 91, 92 (2007); Randy S. Frisch &
Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is There a Leak in the Record Company
Vaults?, 17 Colum. J.L. & Arts 211 (1993).

2.

Sales of recorded music plummeted from $14.6 billion to about $6.3 billion between 2000 and 2009.
Larry Rohter, Record Industry Braces for Artists’ Battles Over Song Rights, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2011, at
C1. See generally Zeb G. Schorr, Note, The Future of Music Online: Balancing the Interests of Labels,
Artists, and the Public, 3 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 67, 68 (2003).

3.

The “IP Clause” empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Part II of this note sets the stage by providing the relevant background on
provisions of the Act relevant to sound recordings and the termination of copyright
transfers. Part III addresses how courts should analyze terminations of sound
recording transfers with regard to works made for hire and authorship. Part IV
discusses statutory reform. Part V suggests the benefits of creating a Music Industry
Working Group on Terminations. Part VI concludes.
II.	BACKGROUND

As background for the analysis to follow, this section begins by explaining the
evolution of copyright protections for sound recordings under the Act, continues
with a summary of the statutory provisions pertaining to termination, and concludes
with an overview of the legal and equitable issues raised by terminations of sound
recording transfers.
A. Copyright Protection for Sound Recordings Today

Sound recordings are one of eight categories of works protected under U.S.
copyright law.4 As defined by the Act, sound recordings are “works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which
they are embodied.”5
The copyright owner of a sound recording has the exclusive right to reproduce
and distribute the sound recording, as well as to prepare derivative works and publicly
perform the sound recording by means of digital audio transmission.6
At least two separate copyrights subsist in a piece of recorded music: a copyright
in the underlying musical work and a separate copyright in the sound recording
itself.7 Typically the author of a musical work assigns the copyright in that musical
work to a publisher, who then contracts with a collective organization (e.g., The
American Society of Composers Authors and Publishers, Broadcast Music, Inc.,
SESAC, and the Harry Fox Agency) to license the work to third parties and collect
royalties.8 The ownership of a copyright in the sound recording of the musical work
4.

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). The other seven categories of works that fall within
the protections of the Act are: “literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words;
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; . . . and architectural
works.” Id.

5.

Id. § 101.

6.

Id. § 106(1)–(6).

7.

Id. § 102(a).

8.

These organizations administer the complex licensing structure for recorded music. ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC are performing rights organizations (PROs) (also referred to as performing rights societies),
which license the musical work for public performance. Id. § 101. See also Brian Day, Note, The Super
Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound Recording Performance Right, 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech.
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initially vests in the “author” of the recording, who then typically assigns that
copyright to the recording company under a standard recording contract.9
B. History of the Protection of Sound Recordings under U.S. Copyright Law

Copyright protection was first extended to sound recordings as part of the 1971
amendment to the Act, which affected recordings made after February 15, 1972.10
Though Congress had previously considered extending copyright protection to sound
recordings, it ultimately enacted the 1971 amendment in response to calls from the
recording industry to curb mounting financial losses attributed to rampant,
unauthorized reproductions of recorded music.11
However, while the 1971 Amendment granted to authors of sound recordings
the exclusive rights to distribute and reproduce their works, Congress did not initially
create a performance right for sound recordings.12 This limitation ref lected an
accommodation to the broadcast industry, which argued that it should not have to
pay license fees to labels and artists because the airtime broadcasters provided was
the equivalent of free promotion.13 Performing Rights Organizations (PROs) also
resisted creation of a performance right for sound recordings, fearing that it would
reduce the royalties they collected from broadcasters.14 United in this shared interest,
L. Rev. 179, 182 (2009). The Harry Fox Agency licenses “mechanical” rights, which relate to the
reproduction and distribution of a musical work. What Does HFA Do?, Harry Fox Agency, http://
www.harryfox.com/public/WhatdoesHFAdo.jsp (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
9.

See Day, supra note 8, at 183 (noting that, despite this typical arrangement, about 1200 artists own and
manage their own sound recording copyrights).

10.

Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. (1971). Sound recordings created prior to February
15, 1972 are ineligible for statutory copyright protection, but remain “widely protected under state law.”
1-2 David Nimmer & Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.10.

11.

Copyright protection for sound recordings was first proposed by the Copyright Office in 1961 and first
proposed in Congress in 1964. United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings As Work Made For
Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 79, 81 (2000) [hereinafter Peters Testimony] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights); Nimmer, supra note 10 (“Reliable trade sources estimated the annual volume of such
piracy to be in excess of $100 million. An additional reason for such enactment was to ‘resolve’ the
problem of federal pre-emption that had pervaded, though not controlled, the attempts to combat
record and tape piracy in the state courts.”); see also Gould, supra note 1, at 97 (2007) (noting that the
amendment was intended to bring the United States into compliance with the Geneva Phonograms
Convention of 1971). The Geneva Phonograms Convention of 1971 requires that
[e]ach Contracting State shall protect producers of phonograms who are nationals of
other Contracting States against the making of duplicates without the consent of the
producer and against the importation of such duplicates, provided that any such making
or importation is for the purpose of distribution to the public, and against the
distribution of such duplicates to the public.

Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms, art. 2, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309.
12.

See Day, supra note 8, at 184.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.
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broadcasters and PROs succeeded in blocking the addition of any performance right
for sound recordings until nearly twenty years later when music distributed digitally
via the Internet became increasingly popular and disrupted sales of physical albums.15
In response, Congress enacted the 1995 Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act, which amended § 106 of the Act to grant sound recording owners
the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission.”16
C. Statutory Provisions Pertaining to the Termination of Copyright Transfers

A fundamental problem underlies transfers of copyright ownership: the
commercial value of any given work is typically unknown prior to its publication, yet
that is precisely when authors often transfer their copyrights.17 As a result, authors
commonly agree to terms that turn out to be less favorable than what they would
have agreed to had they known that their work would become profitable.18
In an attempt to mitigate this problem, Congress created a dual-term structure
for copyright in the 1909 Act.19 The owner of a copyright was entitled to an initial
term of twenty-eight years, after which the author could register for a renewal term
of an additional twenty-eight years.20 If the author did not register for the renewal
term, copyright protection ended and the work went into the public domain after the
initial twenty-eight year term.21
However, in 1943, the Supreme Court limited the ability of authors to take
advantage of this dual-term structure by holding that contracts in which authors
assigned both the initial term and the renewal term to their publisher would be
upheld.22 By permitting authors the right to contract away their renewal term, the
Court effectively undermined the purpose of the dual-term system, because authors
were unable to re-acquire their rights if their work turned out to be more commercially
valuable than initially anticipated.
15.

Id.

16.

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)).

17.

See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights, 57
J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 799, 801 (2010) (“From its earliest manifestations, copyright law has
struggled to deal with the equitable and efficient division of value and control between creators and the
enterprises that distribute their works.”).

18.

See id. at 802.

19.

H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909) (“It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright
outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum.”); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219
(1990): (“In this way, Congress attempted to give the author a second chance to control and benefit from
his work. . . . The renewal term permits the author, originally in a poor bargaining position, to
renegotiate the terms of the grant once the value of the work has been tested.”).

20. Copyright Act of 1909 § 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
21.

Id.

22.

Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).

367

FINDING THE GROOVE: TERMINATIONS OF SOUND RECORDING TRANSFERS

The 1976 Act replaced the dual-term approach with a unitary term. The current
copyright duration for most works created after January 1, 1978 is the life of the
author plus seventy years. 23 For joint works, “the copyright endures for a term
consisting of the life of the last surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving
author’s death.”24 “In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a
work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its
first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever
expires first.”25 Instead of a renewal term, the 1976 Act allows an author who has
transferred his copyright to terminate that transfer thirty-five years after the grant.26
Authors are explicitly prohibited from contracting away their right to terminate a
grant.27 Like it did with the dual-term approach in the 1909 Act, Congress designed
the termination provision in the 1976 Act for the purpose of “safeguarding authors
against unrenumerative transfers . . . [which is] needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining
a work’s prior value until it has been exploited.”28
Section 203 of the 1976 Act contains the provisions relating to termination of
transfers for works made after January 1, 1978.29 The termination right must be
exercised within five years of the end of the thirty-five year period.30 Notice of intent
to terminate a transfer must be given between two and ten years before the date on
which the transfer is eligible for termination. 31 Therefore, copyright transfers
executed on the first day the 1976 Act went into effect, January 1, 1978, are eligible
for termination beginning on January 1, 2013. 32
Works made for hire constitute an important exception to the Act’s termination
provisions. Transfers of copyright in these works are not subject to termination.33 The
23.

17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).

24.

Id. § 302(b).

25.

Id. § 302(c).

26. Id. § 203(a)(3). For works made prior to 1978, the 1976 Act retains the dual-term structure, allowing for

termination subject to the terms of § 304(c). See id. § 203(b)(6) (“Unless . . . termination is effected
under this section, the grant . . . continues in effect for the term of copyright provided by this title.”).

27.

Id. § 203(a)(5) (“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.”).

28. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
29. Though not the focus of this note, termination of transfers for works made before January 1, 1978 are

governed by 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).

30. Id. § 203(a)(3).
31.

Id. § 203(a)(4)(A).

32.

For works created prior to 1978, termination can be invoked by the author beginning fifty-six years after
the grant was made. Id. § 304(c)(3). Sound recordings made between 1972 and 1977 therefore become
eligible for termination beginning in 2028.

33.

Id. § 203(a); see also § 304(a)(1)(B)(ii). Professor Paul Goldstein traces the evolution of the work made
for hire doctrine to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188
U.S. 239, 248 (1903), which held that “[t]here was evidence warranting the inference that the designs
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1909 Copyright Act provided that an employer would be considered the author of a
work made for hire, but did not define what constituted a work made for hire.34 “Work
made for hire” is defined by the 1976 Act as a work either (1) created by an employee
in the course of an employment relationship (the “employment prong”) or (2) where
the parties have agreed in writing that it is “work made for hire” and the work falls
within one of nine enumerated categories (the “independent contractor prong”).35
But even though the Act defines “work made for hire,” courts have been called
upon to provide guidance in applying that definition. With regard to the “employment
prong,” the Supreme Court held in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid that
several factors are relevant to determining whether a author is an “employee,”
including: the skill required, the source of the tools used in creation, the duration of
the relationship between the parties, the extent of the hired party’s discretion over
when and how long to work, the method of payment, the provision of employee
benefits, and the tax treatment of the hired party.36 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has held that these factors should not be applied rigidly, but rather
they should be weighed in relation to their significance in any particular circumstance.37
With regard to the “independent contractor prong,” sound recordings are not
specifically listed among the enumerated categories, but as discussed below, they
could arguably fall within some of the categories listed, such as compilations (which
are defined to include collective works), audiovisual works, or supplemental works. 38
D. Legal Issues Relating to Terminations of Sound Recordings

As pertains to the termination of sound recordings, the ambiguous language of §
203 of the Act raises more questions than it answers. The central legal issue relating
belonged to the plaintiffs, they having been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in
their establishment to make those very things.” United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings As
Work Made For Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 139 (2000) [hereinafter Goldstein Testimony] (statement of Paul Goldstein,
Lillick Professor of Law, Stanford University).
34. Goldstein Testimony, supra note 33, at 139.
35.

17 U.S.C. § 101. The enumerated categories are: contributions to collective works, motion pictures or
other audiovisual works, translations, supplementary works, compilations, instructional texts, tests,
answer material for tests, and atlases. Id.

36. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
37.

Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861–62 (2d Cir. 1992).

38. While this note focuses on works made under the Copyright Act of 1976, it should be noted that courts

have applied a far different test to determine whether works made under the 1909 Act are works made
for hire. For example, the Second Circuit applies an “instance and expense” test. See Fifty-Six Hope
Road Music Ltd. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6143(DLC), 2010 WL 3564258, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010) (holding that “[t]he copyright belongs to the person at whose ‘instance and
expense’ the work was created . . . regardless of whether the work was created by a traditional ‘employee’
or an ‘independent contractor.’” (citing Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found. v. Martha Graham Ctr.
of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d. Cir. 2004)). In addition, the hiring party is
presumed to be the author of a work made for hire, but that presumption can be overcome by evidence
of a contrary agreement. Id. at *8.
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to terminations of sound recordings is whether they are works made for hire.
Interwoven within that key question are ambiguities with regard to authorship: how
is authorship of a sound recording determined? Is the author the singer or band in
whose name the recording is marketed? What about backup performers, producers,
or engineers? Do they have all have claims to joint authorship? And even if a record
company loses ownership of a sound recording, what rights might it still retain under
the derivative works exception?
		

1. Works Made for Hire

Of the two ways a sound recording can qualify as work made for hire under the
statutory definition in the Act, determining the author under the “employment
prong” analysis is the most straightforward. Hardly any modern-day recording artists
are formal employees of the record company for which they record.39 Nevertheless, a
recording artist might be considered an employee under the definition if the Reid
factors are satisfied. That analysis is inherently fact-specific, but most commentators
have concluded that the results will generally be either ambiguous or weigh heavily
against a finding of an employment relationship.40 The few cases where this prong
might apply involve situations where a label employee—perhaps an engineer,
producer, or backup musician—can assert a joint authorship claim because of their
involvement in the creation of the sound recording. The implications of joint
authorship are discussed in Part II.D.2. below.
More controversial is whether a sound recording falls under the “independent
contractor prong” of the work made for hire definition. Standard recording contracts
contain language that recordings made under the agreement are works made for hire,
along with “an additional clause providing that if the work created is found by courts
to fall within neither prong of the definition of works made for hire, that the performer
assigns all his rights to the record company.”41 In addition to the requirement that an
arrangement to create a work make for hire under the “independent contractor prong”
39.

Ryan Ashley Rafoth, Note, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment: Courts Should Not
Consider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists’ Termination Rights Begin Vesting in Year
2013, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1029 (2000).

40. See, e.g., Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie Bonds: The Debate

Over Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, 48 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A 145, 171–72 (2000);
Gould, supra note 1, at 80 (“Most commentators have concluded that recording artists will not be
deemed by courts to be employees of record labels under the Reid and Aymes line of cases.”); see also
Kathryn Starshak, It’s the End of the World as Musicians Know It, Or Is It?: Artists Battle the Record
Industry and Congress to Restore Their Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 71,
104 (2001) (providing thorough Reid factor analysis and concluding that a typical recording artist would
not be considered an record company employee under the test); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer,
Defusing the Termination of Transfers Time Bomb 3 (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Working
Paper, 2005), available at http://www.idc.ac.il/ipatwork/PUBLICATION/Defusing.pdf (“Most of the
sound recordings of significant economic value in their 35th year will likely be wholly or partially
outside of the scope of works made for hire doctrine.”); Rafoth, supra note 39.

41.

Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 88.
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be memorialized in a written agreement, the work must also fall within one the
enumerated categories in § 101.
According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), where
there is a written agreement that a sound recording is a work made for hire, that
contract should be upheld under the Act and the work deemed a work made for hire
because “[a] sound recording is a work for which an entity commissions many
people—featured artists, background musicians and vocalists, producers, arrangers,
mixers, and studio engineers, and others—to collaborate for the purpose of creating
that sound recording.”42 Nevertheless, it is unclear how such a work falls within the
statutory definition of works made for hire where the recording artist is not an
employee of the label and none of the enumerated categories are applicable. In an
effort to clarify that ambiguity, the RIAA successfully lobbied in 2000 for sound
recordings to be included among the enumerated categories of works made for hire
under the “independent contractor prong,”43 but the amendment was repealed a year
later.44 “As a result of this ‘millennial f lip-f lop,’ the issue is now left squarely
indeterminate.”45 Nevertheless, even though sound recordings are not included in the
enumerated categories of works that may be considered works made for hire per se,
industry advocates have argued that sound recordings fit into other per se categories,
such as the categories for an audiovisual work, compilation (defined as including
collective works), or a supplementary work.46
		 2. Authorship

The difficulties in identifying the author of a sound recording present another
legal issue with regard to terminations, because it is only the author or his heirs who
may terminate a grant. Authorship of a sound recording can be exceedingly difficult
to determine, because any number of people—singers, musicians, producers,
engineers—may have made significant creative contributions to any given recording.
While the Act does not define authorship for sound recordings,47 the legislative
history addressed the issue by explaining that the “copyrightable elements in a sound
recording” may include contributions from the performers and or the producer.”48
Ultimately, however, the law does not “fix the authorship, or the resulting ownership,
of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the employment relationship and
42.

FAQ on Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. (May 24, 2000),
http://www.riaa.com/print.php?id=00EB75A2-8B0B-CDCD-175F-1213B5DFA681.

43.

See David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works For Hire, and the Termination-of-Transfers
Time Bomb, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 387, 388–93 (2001).

44. Id. at 394.
45.

Id. at 387.

46. Rafoth, supra note 39, at 1041–44; see also Gould, supra note 1.
47.

“[T]he Revision Bill takes the ostrich tack of omitting to say who is to be the presumptive owner of the
copyright—performer, manufacturer, or both.” Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright:
Proposals and Prospects, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 831, 846 (1966).

48. H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 1570 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-72, at 1570 (1971).
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bargaining among the interests involved.”49 Noticeably missing from Congress’s
calculation is any consideration of joint authorship claims asserted by record
companies.
A “joint work” is defined as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts
of a unitary whole.”50 For joint works made after January 1, 1978, the majority of
authors must agree to terminate the grant.51 In contrast, transfers of joint works
made prior to that date may be terminated by any of the authors “to the extent of a
particular author’s share in the ownership of the renewal copyright.”52
Fortunately, the issues surrounding claims of joint authorship, as discussed in
Part III, are not as dire as they may first appear, since a majority of courts have held
that only those individuals who contribute independently copyrightable expression
and posses a mutual intent to share authorship qualify as joint authors.53 For example,
a woman who was present during the recording session for Jay-Z’s hit song “Izzo
(H.O.V.A.)” contemporaneously improvised a vocal line that was eventually
performed by another singer and added to the recording. While Jay-Z agreed to
incorporate the woman’s melody line, her argument that she was therefore entitled to
joint authorship failed because “this argument misapprehends the requirement that
the parties must intend to share the rights of authorship rather than merely intend to
enter into a relationship that results in the creation of a copyrightable work.”54 The
court held that Jay-Z was entitled to summary judgment and that the woman could
not sustain a claim of joint authorship because she failed to present evidence that
Jay-Z intended to share authorship with her.55
Limiting joint authorship claims helps promote the progress of the arts because
“progress would be retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not consult with
others and adopt their useful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the
49. Id.
50. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006).
51.

Id. § 203(a)(1).

52.

Id. § 304(c)(1).

53.

See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and
the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Right of Joint Authors, 50 Emory L.J. 193, 196–97 (2001); see also
Abbott M. Jones, Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Joint Authorship Conundrum for Sound Recordings, 10 Vand.
J. Ent. & Tech. L. 525, 528 (2008) (“The Register of Copyrights has stated that independent
copyrightability is required under the statutory standard of authorship and, perhaps, under the
Constitution as well.”). But see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
mutual intent to create a joint work will support a finding of joint authorship, regardless of whether
each author’s contribution is independently copyrightable). The Seventh Circuit’s approach is consistent
with the position advanced by Nimmer, which argues that a lower threshold for joint authorship
incentivizes collaboration and rewards more artists for their contributions. 1-6 David Nimmer &
Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07[A][3][a] (2007).

54. Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
55.

Id.
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work.”56 But where there are legitimate claims of joint authorship in a sound recording,
termination can become vastly complicated and hamper efficient exploitation of the
work. For example, if each coauthor of a joint work is entitled to terminate a grant,
“the grantee who originally received exclusive rights from all of the coauthors will be
transformed into a nonexclusive licensee when even a single coauthor exercises the
termination right and the other coauthors do not.”57
While transfers of post-1978 works can be terminated only upon agreement of a
majority of authors who signed the transfer agreement,58 complications arise where
other joint authors may have executed separate transfer agreements. In such cases,
one joint author could choose to terminate his grant, while others do not. This would
allow the original grantee-record company to continue exploiting the work. If the
joint author who terminated his grant negotiated terms with another record company,
“multiple versions of a single sound recording could in theory be on the market
simultaneously, competing with each other.”59
Advocates of the record company’s position argue that joint authorship claims
will burden artists, too. Faced with multiple joint authorship claims from the wide
assortment of contributors to a recording—e.g., vocalists, musicians, producers, and
engineers—an artist “would be in no position to renegotiate with [his label] nor to
convey exclusive rights to a third party without first coming to terms with each of his
several co-authors.”60
The record companies point to the complications of joint authorship and
termination as support for their argument that all sound recordings should simply be
considered works made for hire.61 Otherwise, they warn, determining who has the
right to terminate a transfer “might require years of litigation to sort out who has
what rights.”62
E. Equitable Considerations

Apart from the knotty legal issues surrounding terminations of sound recording
transfers, both artists and record companies cite equitable concerns to support
resolutions that would ultimately give them a greater degree of control over sound
recordings. Less attention has been focused on the equities affecting the general
56. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
57.

Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 85.

58. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006).
59.

Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 86. This problem is exacerbated for pre-1978 sound recordings because
such works are subject to the termination provisions of § 304, under which termination “may be
exercised by any of the coauthors of a joint work, even if all the coauthors executed the same original
grant of rights. Such a termination shall affect only that ‘’particular author’s share in the ownership of
the renewal copyright.” Id.; see also Nimmer & Menell, supra note 43, at 408.

60. Goldstein Testimony, supra note 33, at 145.
61.

See Larry Rohter, Don Henley Urges Artists to Know Their Rights, NYTimes.com (Aug. 16, 2011, 8:00
AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/don-henley-urges-artists-to-know-their-rights/.

62. Id.
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public, which is the perspective that I argue should dictate the ultimate resolution.
This subsection considers each view in turn.
		

1. From the Standpoint of Recording Artists

Don Henley, a member of the chart-topping 1970s band The Eagles, characterizes
the issue of sound recording terminations in moral terms. He states that “the
recording industry has made a gazillion dollars on those masters, more than the
artists have”63 and that “[t]he artists create these works and they should own them.
It’s as simple as that. I want to be able to pass them on to my kids. It’s part of their
legacy, or should be.”64 As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, inequities
between authors and publishers in general have historically characterized contractual
arrangements affecting copyright, and termination provisions are designed to address
those inequities.65 Since the beginning of recorded music, unfair exploitation of
artists due to their inferior bargaining power and inferior sophistication in business
and legal matters has been common and well documented.66
Corporate concentration in the music industry has made these issues of control
and inequity particularly acute. Three companies—Universal Music Group, Sony
Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group—control nearly every aspect of the
international music industry,67 and consolidation is accelerating: EMI, formerly a
fourth industry behemoth, recently sold its record label to Universal for $1.9 billion
and its publishing operation to Sony for $2.2 billion.68
63. Rohter, supra note 2.
64. Rohter, supra note 61.
65.

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218–19 (1990).

66. See generally Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual

Property and How It Threatens Creativity, ch. 4 (2001).

67.

Tracy C. Gardner, Note, Expanding the Rights of Recording Artists: An Argument to Repeal Section 2855(b)
of the California Labor Code, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 721, 721–22 (2007).

Id.

[These three companies] control manufacturing, distribution, retailing, shelf space,
record clubs, and digital delivery, not only in the United States, but also in all markets
worldwide. [They] specialize in marketing and promoting records to mass audiences,
and they have the capital to take huge financial risks to advance an artist. Furthermore,
only a few media companies control most of the nation’s radio stations, making it that
much more difficult for an artist to get her music on the air without the backing of one
of the major labels.

68. Dana Cimilluca & Max Colchester, Universal, Sony Split Up EMI Group, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2011, at

B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204224604577031694160429400.
html. The expected adverse effect that the proposed deal would have on competition has drawn concern
from regulators in the United States and Europe. See Diane Bartz, Antitrust Group Asks for Universal,
EMI Deal to be Stopped, Reuters (August 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/
us-emi-universal-antitrust-idUSBRE87T1IP20120830. “The independent American Antitrust
Institute said the planned purchase raised substantial concerns because it would reduce the number of
major music companies to three from four, and would give Universal life-or-death power over digital
entrants that rely upon being able to license music.” Id.
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Even as traditional methods of exploiting sound recordings have increasingly
become less profitable, record labels have continued to exert great control over artists’
careers through new types of deals that allow the record companies to claim
significant portions of artists’ other revenues, such as those generated by touring,
ringtones, digital distribution, and film and television.69 Typical recording contracts
are long-term, requiring an artist to deliver five to seven albums, typically with a
mandatory two-year time span between albums, and artists may be liable for damages
if they fail to deliver the required number of albums.70 Though artists receive royalties
from the sale of their sound recordings, many artists believe their royalties are too
small, and many artists actually come away owing their record company money
because contracts typically require the artists to repay the record company for
recording costs out of their royalties.71
		

2. From the Standpoint of Record Labels

Record companies invest large sums of money into developing and promoting
new artists, most of whom will not succeed.72 The high risk inherent in these
investments is significantly heightened by the effect digital technology has had on
plummeting record sales.73 When sound recordings do generate profits, the industry
argues that those funds are invested into nurturing the next generation of talent.74 If
artists could easily terminate their transfers, it might remove incentives for labels to
sign new artists.75 Furthermore, without the certainty provided by uninterrupted
record label control of sound recordings, there is a fear that “a random backup
guitarist will arrive at the door of the copyright owner thirty-five years after a
recording is created and terminate his licensed performance on the album,” thus
hampering efficient exploitation and profitability for all the other stakeholders.76
Then there is the phenomenon referred to as the “long tail.” 77 Prior to the advent
of digital music, current hits dominated record sales and very few older recordings
were profitable.78 That is no longer true because digital technology makes it more
69. Gardner, supra note 67, at 726.
70. Id. at 723–25.
71.

Id.

72. United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings As Work Made For Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm.

on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 125 (2000) (statement of
Hilary Rosen, President and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America) [hereinafter Rosen
Testimony] (“Typically, less than 15% of all sound recordings released by major record companies will
ever make back their costs. Far fewer return profit.”).

73. See generally Rohter, supra note 2.
74.

Rosen Testimony, supra note 72, at 124–26.

75. Starshak, supra note 40, at 121.
76. Id. at 122.
77.

Gould, supra note 1, at 93.

78. Id. at 93–94.
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feasible for retailers and consumers to store nearly unlimited numbers of recordings,
and back catalogs from established artists are increasingly profitable.79 Also, older
recordings have higher profit margins because duplication costs are de minimis
compared to the high fixed costs required to develop and promote new acts.80 Finally,
record companies are valued based on the estimated worth of their future revenues;
uncertainty surrounding copyright ownership undermines the ability of these
companies to sell their ownership interests.81
		

3. From the Standpoint of Consumers

This note argues that, because public benefit is the driving concern of U.S.
copyright law, the only equities that should determine how sound recording
terminations are resolved are those that pertain to the public interest. As Benjamin
Kaplan wrote, “When the ordinary regime of the market is displaced and monopoly
aids substituted, an estimate of the inducements to producers calculated to maximize
public satisfactions becomes the chief rational measure of copyright protection.”82 To
“maximize the public satisfactions” in the context of sound recording terminations, a
successful resolution is one that: induces artists to create by promising them fair
financial benefit and control relative to their commercial success; balances those
inducements with incentives for industry to both invest in new acts and promote and
distribute their music; facilitates efficient exploitation by unifying control and
minimizing transaction costs; and enhances the predictability necessary for smooth
functioning of the marketplace. The remainder of this note focuses on how to achieve
these results.
III.	RESOLUTION UNDER CURRENT LAW

I now turn to an analysis of how courts ought to resolve disputes over terminations
of sound recording transfers under current law. As discussed in Part II.D.1., most
commentators agree that sound recordings are not works made for hire, and I begin
by laying out what I consider to be the appropriate analysis in support of that position. 83
Next I consider the joint authorship issue and conclude that that it is less problematic
than the record industry and its defenders suggest. Finally, I argue that, insofar as
these conclusions facilitate artists ability to terminate transfers of sound recordings,
such a result is doctrinally sound and ultimately advances the public interest.
79. Id. at 93.
80. Id. at 94.
81.

Id.

82. Kaplan, supra note 47, at 849.
83. Starshak, supra note 40, at 104 (providing thorough Reid factor analysis and concluding that a typical

recording artist would not be considered a record company employee under the test); Menell & Nimmer,
supra note 40 (“Most of the sound recordings of significant economic value in their 35th year will likely be
wholly or partially outside of the scope of works made for hire doctrine.”); see, e.g., Gould, supra note 1, at
109 (“Most commentators have concluded that recording artists will not be deemed by courts to be
employees of record labels under the Reid and Aymes line of cases.”). See generally Rafoth, supra note 39.

376

N

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

A. Most Sound Recordings Are Not Works Made for Hire under the Act

Few courts have considered whether sound recordings created after 1978 are
works made for hire, but those that have found that the particular sound recordings
before them did not qualify under the statutory definition.84 As explained below,
other courts should follow suit, because most sound recordings were not made in the
context of an employment relationship, and few fit within the enumerated categories
necessary to satisfy the independent contractor prong.
		

1. Most Sound Recordings Do Not Satisfy the “Employment Prong”

Randy Frisch and Matthew Fortnow were among the first to publicly sound the
alarm about the impending problems of sound recording terminations.85 “After
analyzing the relationship of artist and record company under the factors in C.C.N.V.
v. Reid, Aymes v. Bonelli, and the terms of the [standard] record contract,”86 they
concluded in their 1993 article that “it seems that an artist is not an employee for
copyright purposes.”87
Most modern sound recordings are not works made for hire under the employment
prong because the recording industry has evolved in such a way that labels exert less
direct control over recording artists, particularly with regard to the Reid factors.88
While it was common in the 1960s for record companies to manage all aspects of the
creative process, including hiring personnel necessary to facilitate the recording

84. See, e.g., Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that a sound recording did not

satisfy the Reid criteria where, although the distributor claiming ownership had exerted some creative
control, the recording was made in the artist’s own studio); Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding in dicta that sound recordings are not works made for hire because
they do not fit within any of the statutory definition’s enumerated categories). But see Fifty-Six Hope
Road Music v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6143(DLC), 2010 WL 3564258, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2010) (holding that pre-1978 recordings made by Bob Marley were works made for hire under
the 1909 Copyright Act because they were made at the “instance and expense” of his record company).
The issue has not been more widely considered by courts because it is not yet timely. Nimmer & Menell,
supra note 43, at 390.

85. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 1, at 215.
86. “[M]ost record contracts specify, for liability purposes, that the artist is an independent contractor and

not an employee of the record company.” Id. at 221.

87.

Id.; see also Menell & Nimmer, supra note 40 (“Most of the sound recordings of significant economic value
in their 35th year will likely be wholly or partially outside of the scope of works made for hire doctrine.”).

88. See Rohter, supra note 2.

Id.

This is a situation where you have to use your own common sense,’ said June M. Besek,
executive director of the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts at the
Columbia University School of Law. ‘Where do they work? Do you pay Social Security
for them? Do you withdraw taxes from a paycheck? Under those kinds of definitions it
seems pretty clear that your standard kind of recording artist from the ‘70s or ‘80s is not
an employee but an independent contractor.
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process and even owning the recording studio, recording artists today exercise greater
discretion in making these decisions.89
Illustrating how the respective contributions of artists and record labels have
evolved since the 1960s, Sheryl Crow testified before Congress about the control she
exercises and the costs she incurs in the recording process, contrasting the
characteristics of recordings with those of films, which are a paradigmatic example
of works made for hire:
I am basically left to my devices in creating a work. I choose what the sound
should be by choosing and working closely with a producer, or in my case I
produce my own material. I choose the musicians, the engineers, the studio all
based on what it is I am striving to express artistically. But the most important
factor is that I pay for the recording of my albums and a portion of the marketing
of the album out of my own royalties, as do all other recording artists.

This is where we, as authors of our own work, differ from the film
industry. Comparisons with regard to the work for hire amendment have
been made where it is necessary to treat films as a work made for hire to avoid
issues of authorship. The record business is different than the film industry in
a fundamental way. In the film industry, the studio pays the production costs,
they hire the director, they hire the actors, they come out with a product that
they have hired to be fulfilled, and then they own the film. The cost of the
production is never charged back to the creative contributors.90

In the 2000 congressional hearing about sound recordings as works made for
hire, RIAA President and CEO Hilary Rosen sharply disputed Crow’s analysis of
the recording industry’s financial role in the exploitation of sound recordings.91
In addition to providing advance payments to artists for use by them in the
recording process, a record company invests time, energy and money into
advertising costs, retail store positioning fees, listening posts in record stores,
radio promotions, press and public relations for the artist, television
appearances and travel, publicity, and Internet marketing, promotions and
contests. These costs are investments that companies make to promote the
success of the artist so that both can profit from the sale of the artist’s
recording. In addition, the record company typically pays one half of
independent radio promotions, music videos, and tour support. If a recording
is not successful, the company loses its entire investment, including the
advance. If a recording is successful, the advance is taken out of royalties, but
the other costs I mentioned are the responsibility of the record company.92

89. Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 89. (“[F]eatured artists have increasingly come to control the creative

elements of a sound recording, making it considerably more difficult now for record companies to
characterize artists as employees producing works within the scope of their employment.”).

90. United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings As Work Made For Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm.

on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 161–62 (2000) (statement
of Sheryl Crow).

91.

Rosen Testimony, supra note 72 at 122–34.

92.

Id. at 124.
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But Rosen misses the point. The types of investments she describes are marketing
costs. As Rosen describes it, a record company’s “sphere of expertise and value added
is the marketplace. Find the fan, sell the music. Create the demand.”93 But regardless
of the risk and magnitude of such expenditures, they cannot be reasonably equated
with employment. The Supreme Court in Bleistein found that an employer was the
author of a design that was “produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs
in their establishment to make those very things.” 94 However, spending money on
marketing cannot possibly be sufficient to constitute authorship because it promotes
the product after creation as opposed to creating the conditions necessary for its
invention. Therefore, while it is essential that record companies receive the benefit of
their investments by owning exclusive rights to the first thirty-five years of the sound
recording’s copyright term, it makes no sense to view the financial role they play in
the recording’s success as equivalent to ownership. To conclude otherwise is
inconsistent with the work made for hire doctrine.
		

2. Most Sound Recordings Do Not Satisfy the “Independent Contractor Prong”

Sound recordings should also not be considered works made for hire under the
“independent contractor prong.” Since sound recordings are excluded from the list of
enumerated categories under the works made for hire definition of § 101,95 they
cannot be works made for hire per se. In drafting the works made for hire definition,
Congress methodically debated the rationale for each enumerated category. But while
“sound recordings were being contemplated as copyrightable subject matter . . . they
were never proffered as a category to be added to the list of commissioned works.”96
In the congressional hearings that led to repeal of the short-lived amendment
that added sound recordings to the list of enumerated categories, Professor Goldstein,
who provided analysis at the request of the RIAA, argued that albums were collective
works, but that “[b]ecause questions, however groundless, have been raised about the
status of sound recordings as collective works, it was logical for Congress to add
sound recordings as a tenth category of work for hire, an addition that does not
substantially change current work for hire law or allocations of rights.”97 However,
Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters disagreed, stating that while courts may, in
some situations, conclude that a specific sound recording constitutes a contribution
to a collective work, “I do not consider the recent amendment to have been a technical
amendment. It changed existing law by adding sound recordings as a category of
commissioned works which may be considered works made for hire.” 98
93.

Id.

94. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
95. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006).
96. Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 246.
97.

Goldstein Testimony, supra note 33, at 138.

98. Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 91.
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Some, like Mary LaFrance, have argued, however, that distinctions between the
enumerated categories are malleable and that sound recordings could easily fit within
the definitions of audiovisual works, compilations, or collective works, therefore
making them works made for hire if the artist had signed an agreement acknowledging
it as such.99 However, LaFrance also acknowledges that for courts to interpret sound
recordings as included within one of the enumerated categories would contravene
congressional intent because “one reasonably would have expected Congress to have
mentioned specifically” that it intended to extend work made for hire status to such
a large category of works.100 On the other hand, one might argue that Congress
could have affirmed that intent when it repealed the short-lived amendment that
added sound recordings to the enumerated categories in 2000, yet chose instead to
explicitly state that it was neutral on this issue.101
Nevertheless, determining whether any given sound recording fits within an
enumerated category is highly fact-specific. For example, a court might reasonably
find that Biophilia,102 the 2011 album by Icelandic singer Björk, is either an
audiovisual work or a compilation, or both. Although it is available for sale on iTunes
as a traditional album, “[t]he far more exciting option is to acquire the “Biophilia”
program from the iPad App Store.”103
“Biophilia” essentially turns an album into a sort of audiovisual game,
delivering a miniature production studio into the world’s willing hands . . . .

On the iPad screen a galaxy unfolds that you can twist and zoom and
pan. Each of the 10 major stars represents a song. When you tap a star, you
are offered ways to explore, understand and interact with the tune. There are
lyrics and detailed musical analyses. You can watch a scrolling score of the
song or simply listen as a colorful visualization passes by . . . .
The real magic happens when you press “play.” That doesn’t tell the
machine to play the song; it means it’s time for you to play the song . . . .

99. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 375, 398–

403 (2002).

100. Id. at 416; see also Field, supra note 40, at 176–77.
101. The House Report accompanying the amendment stated:

The purpose of . . . the “Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000”,
is to restore the status quo as it existed before November 29, 1999, as to the issue of
whether a sound recording can qualify as a “work made for hire” . . . and to do so in a
manner that does not prejudice any person or entity that might have interests concerning
this question.

H.R. Rep. No. 106-861 at 1 (2000).

102. Bjork, Biophilia (Nonesuch Records 2011).
103. Seth Schiesel, Playing the New Bjork Album, and Playing Along, with Apps, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2011, at

A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/arts/video-games/bjorks-biophilia-an-album-asgame.html?pagewanted=all.
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Bjork and her team have created a small visual toolbox for each track. A
few, like “Crystalline,” play much like a simple video game. In “Crystalline”
you tilt and swivel the iPad to add colorful crystals to a growing agglomeration
as you zoom along neon tunnels. It is one of the few elements of “Biophilia”
in which you are not controlling the sound. Instead you are having a visual
and motor-control experience meant to complement it . . . .
In “Thunderbolt” you augment the song with flashes of lightning and
waves of electronica, as if manipulating a sort of personal beat box. In
“Hollow” you queue up various proteins for what is meant to be a representation
of the microscopic DNA machines within us. Different proteins change the
rhythm to time signatures of varying complexity, while you can drag a control
to change the tempo, or beats per minute . . . .
These are toys that children could play with for a moment and in some
cases serious musical tools that professionals, students and enthusiasts could
spend many hours exploring. Some of the programs allow you to save your
creations for future editing or sharing with friends, though by handing them
your iPad, not by exporting your creation to another device or program.104

If one accepts The New York Times description of Biophilia as “among the most
creative, innovative and important new projects in popular culture,”105 it is easy to
imagine a court finding that it fits one or more of the enumerated categories, including
a contribution to a collective work, audiovisual work, compilation, or supplementary
work.106 But Biophilia also illustrates why a sound recording should not be a work
made for hire under either of the two prongs. Had Björk limited her project to only
the audio components, she would almost certainly be able to terminate her transfer of
copyright ownership to her record company in thirty-five years. It seems impossible to
justify that copyright law ought to instead punish Björk’s more ambitious innovation
by denying her that termination right. Such a perverse incentive is in fact contrary to
the constitutional mandate of copyright law to promote the useful arts.
Another reason courts should not hold that sound recordings fall within one of
the enumerated categories is that doing so would disproportionately hurt new artists
because of their unequal bargaining position. Since the “independent contractor
prong” also requires a written agreement that the work is made for hire, established
artists might be able to avoid the termination “trap” since they have the clout to insist
that the work for hire language not be included in their contracts. But, as
Representative Howard Berman observed in the 2000 Congressional hearing, “the
artist who doesn’t have the clout to keep that out of the contract is the artist who
may most really be needing the right of termination in 35 years because no one has
compensated him for the possible big hit.”107
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
107. Nimmer & Menell, supra note 43, at 412.
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B. Joint Authorship and Sound Recordings: A Red Herring?

As discussed above,108 the recording industry and several scholars have suggested
that sound recordings should be considered works made for hire on the basis that
sound recordings are inherently joint works and competing claims from joint authors
will increase transaction costs, lead to costly litigation, and make efficient exploitation
of sound recordings burdensome if not impossible.109
Fortunately, this parade of horribles will not likely come to pass because joint
authorship claims are sharply limited by the Act and case law.110 The statutory
definition of “joint work” requires that the authors intend for their contributions be
merged into “inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”111 And courts
have held that this intent must not only be mutual, but that, at least in the majority
circuits, authorship will be recognized only for those who contribute independently
copyrightable expression.112 That precludes minor players in the production of sound
recordings from asserting legitimate joint authorship claims.
Furthermore, while the Act does not define authorship with regard to sound
recordings, the legislative history left “these matters to the employment relationship
and bargaining among the interests involved.”113 Therefore, some have suggested that
artists can protect themselves by signing standard agreements with those whom they
bring in to work on a recording, stipulating that their work is provided without claim
of authorship.114 While it is true that legitimate joint authorship claims might
complicate termination and efficient exploitation, the scale of the problem is more
manageable than has been suggested because the purportedly limitless authorship
claims feared by the industry are in fact limited by the law and were envisioned by
Congress as something to be addressed in a contract among the parties.
As Don Henley argues, fears of joint authorship claims should not support the
withholding of termination rights from recording artists. “[I]f the producer wants the right
of termination, or the percussionist, let me deal with that. Let me worry about that. Better
the chaos on the artists’ side than the side of the labels, which are in chaos already.”115

108. See supra Part II.C.2.
109. Goldstein Testimony, supra note 33, at 140.
110. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.2.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
112. See LaFrance, supra note 53.
113. Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 79 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-72, at 5

(1971)).

114. Field, supra note 40, at 178.
115. Rohter, supra note 61.

382

N

VOLUME 57 | 2012/13

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

C.	The Public Would Not Be Served by Designating Sound Recordings as Works Made
for Hire

I have argued that the doctrinal analysis supports a finding that most sound
recordings under the Act are not works made for hire and that joint authorship
claims will not lead to the uncontrollable inefficiencies some fear. To the extent that
this conclusion means that future sound recording transfer agreements will need to
be renegotiated after thirty-five years, then that is a good thing because it serves the
purpose underlying termination rights: giving authors a second bite at the apple when
it turns out that their work is worth far more than they initially bargained for. The
public wins because the recognition of termination rights preserves the incentives
necessary for artists to create work that connects with an audience and yet gives
record companies ample time to benefit from their investments. Where agreements
with the original record company cannot be reached, artists will be free to find a
better deal with another label, or even find ways to market their own works more
effectively, thus introducing increased competitiveness into an increasingly centralized
music industry. Financial rewards for creative production and innovative distribution
are the hallmarks of a properly calibrated copyright system.
IV.	PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY AMENDMENT

This section addresses statutory amendments to the Act that have been proposed
to improve the termination process for future sound recordings. In keeping with the
arguments made above, any statutory amendment should be doctrinally sound,
ensure that incentives are properly calibrated to maximize consumer interest, and
facilitate an efficient marketplace.
Certainly, the notion of a clarifying “fix” is deceptively simple since there is no
agreement as to what that fix might be. John Conyers, the ranking Democrat on the
House Judiciary Committee, has called for such an amendment “to preserve fairness
and justice for artists.”116 Yet the prospects for a legislative solution to the problems of
sound recording terminations appear uncertain given the contentiousness of the issue
and the controversial history of amendments to the Act.117 Representative Conyers
has not publicly stated how he would amend the statute.
Some like Mary LaFrance argue that congressional inaction will foster
uncertainty and unpredictability in the marketplace.118 This would be “the worst way
to address the sound recording issue [because] the authorship rules for sound
recordings are an important and sensitive matter that should be resolved only after a
careful assessment of the competing public and private interests” and would leave
116. Larry Rohter, Legislator Calls for Clarifying Copyright Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2011, at C1, available

at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/arts/music/representative-john-conyers-wants-copyright-lawrevision.html?pagewanted=all.

117. Id.; see also Gould, supra note 1, at 137 n. 4 (2007) (“Given that the 1976 Act revision process lasted

twenty years and that the last attempt at amendment of the work-made-for-hire provisions led to repeal
without change in 2000, the odds of a statutory revision are admittedly low.”).

118. LaFrance, supra note 98, at 395–96.
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unaddressed the ambiguities of work for hire doctrine.119 LaFrance’s preferred
legislative solution would be to eliminate termination rights for sound recordings and
strengthen termination rights for songwriters because copyright in a musical work is
valuable and less likely to be encumbered by intractable claims of joint authorship.120
But while this proposal might make sense for songwriters who record their own
work, many recording artists do not perform original music, and it seems unjustified
to deny to these artists the rights that would be exclusively bestowed upon composers.
More promising are two suggestions that hold promise for clarifying the issues of
authorship and control. The first is the “Key Contributors” idea advanced by
Marybeth Peters, which would define the author of a sound recording as the principal
artist. The second, legislative unitization, is currently being developed by David
Nimmer and Peter Menell and aims to make the exploitation of sound recordings
more efficient.121 The remainder of this section considers each proposal in turn.
As Peters explained at the 2000 congressional hearing, her proposal seeks to
preserve and strengthen termination rights for sound recordings by clarifying who
should properly be considered an author and doing so in a way that is consistent with
copyright doctrine and common sense.
The Copyright Office believes that those who contribute significant
authorship to a sound recording should have the right to terminate. I will
refer to these persons as “key contributors.” I use the term “key contributors”
because, as the recording industry has correctly emphasized, permitting every
contributor to a sound recording to exercise termination rights could make
the exploitation of a sound recording unworkable. I do not proffer this term as
a proposed statutory term, nor do I offer any specific legislative language at
this time. Rather, I offer it as a concept that should seriously be explored.

Who is a “key contributor”? It is someone who has made a major
contribution of copyrightable expression to a sound recording. Ordinarily, it
would include the featured performer or performers. For example, Frank
Sinatra and Madonna would clearly be key contributors of authorship to the
sound recordings on which they perform. Each of the members of the Beatles
and Metallica would also be key contributors. In contrast, a background
musician would not be a key contributor. Exempting those key contributors
from the work made for hire provisions should result in only a limited number
of potential terminations. This could be accomplished by retaining the
inclusion of sound recordings among the categories of works eligible to be
commissioned works made for hire, but excluding the contributions of these
key contributors from work-made-for-hire status. The result would be that
the sound recording would be a joint work that is in part a work made for hire
and in part a work of individual authors . . . .

119. Id.
120. Id. at 417–18.
121. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 40.
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Consideration should also be given to whether producers of sound
recordings should, at least in some circumstances, also be able to terminate as
key contributors. There are many examples of producers, such as Quincy
Jones, Phil Spector, and Babyface, whose contribution of authorship to a
sound recording can equal or even exceed that of the featured artist.122

The “key contributor” idea is not without problems. Identifying who is a “key
contributor” would pose the most significant challenge. In the worst-case scenario,
the potential free-for-all of joint authorship claims critics of termination fear would
nonetheless ensue. Nevertheless, the “key contributor” concept finds support in case
law. In Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a minor
contributor to a motion picture was not a joint author under the Act.123 Applied to
the context of sound recordings, courts could find that “the only cognizable ‘authors’
of sound recordings are their featured artists.”124
The “key contributor” approach “would also promote predictability and stability
within the industry by preventing background musicians and others, who have a
licensed contribution on the recording, from terminating their agreements . . . . By
allowing sound recordings to partially qualify for work-for-hire status, this problem
can be avoided.”125 The result would represent “a middle ground that would benefit
both parties [by providing] new clarity in the law and a lowered transaction cost,
because when the secondary contributors entered into work-made-for-hire agreements
for sound recordings, they would be binding under copyright law.”126
Another promising legislative approach to addressing the problems with
terminations of sound recording transfers seeks to strike a balance between achieving
efficient control and exploitation of sound recordings, while recognizing the rights of
multiple owners of the work. In a draft working paper, Nimmer and Menell propose
“a form of legislative unitization in which common ownership would be preserved
but exploitation would be governed through a unified corporate decisionmaking
structure. In this way, Congress could better protect the value of the resource, contain
the transactions costs, and possibly better calibrate the distributive effects of this
mechanism.”127
While intense lobbying has historically rendered congressional action on
copyright law either impossible or caused it to become mired in narrow specialinterest exceptions, both of these proposals would go a long way in improving the
system for future sound recordings and should therefore be seriously considered.

122. Peters Testimony, supra note 11, at 93–94.
123. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F. 3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
124. Nimmer & Menell, supra note 43, at 414.
125. Starshak, supra note 40, at 121–22.
126. Field, supra note 40, at 183–84.
127. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 40 at 183–84.
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V.	Beyond Brinksmanship: The Benefits of a Cooperative Approach

If, as this note argues, a balanced approach to resolving terminations is more
likely to achieve the efficiencies and calibrated incentives I have described, then a
cooperative approach should be seriously considered as an alternative to high-stakes,
winner-takes-all litigation.128 While it may be tempting for record companies, many
of which are owned by deep-pocketed multi-national corporations, to wage an
aggressive war of attrition against artists in the courts, they face considerable legal
obstacles, as I have outlined above. And while some artists may see themselves as
morally justified in reclaiming the copyrights to their recordings, most are probably
unable to sustain the costs of protracted litigation and ill-equipped to administer
their works on their own. Victory for either side would come not only at great expense
to the parties involved, but would also do little to improve the chances of ultimately
managing sound recordings more efficiently.129 Most significantly, to the extent that
a cooperative approach might minimize costs and maximize market efficiencies,
consumers would ideally benefit because the marketplace would promote the
proliferation of sound recordings without passing on the costs of excessive litigation.
To this end, I propose the creation of a new body, the Music Industry Working
Group on Terminations (the “Working Group”). The Working Group would be
directed by a board of key stakeholders, including legal scholars, consumer
representatives, artists, and record companies and would serve two primary purposes.
First, it would develop a set of best practices and agreed-upon principles to guide
negotiations between labels and artists currently under contract, as well as standardized
language for agreements between record companies and new artists. The Working
Group’s recommendations would encompass everything from financial terms to a
system of efficient control and administration. The Working Group’s second function
would be to offer arbitration services for artists and labels that were interested in
having their disputes resolved by a neutral third-party bound by the best practices
developed by the Group. This would minimize litigation costs and enhance
predictability and consistency in the resolution process. As mentioned above, these
goals not only advance the interests of labels and artists, but of consumers as well.
To be sure, the creation of such a Working Group may be greeted in some
quarters with cynicism. Some may dismiss such broad collaboration as Pollyanna-ish
or unrealistic. It is true that the Working Group model would only work if a large
number of artists and record companies participate. Of course, artists and labels
would be free to take their chances in court if they could get a better deal than the
128. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 1, at 93.
129. For example, since all sound recordings are also separately copyrightable as derivative works of an

underlying music composition, the termination issue is complicated by the fact that a record company
may continue to be able to exploit a sound recording even after an artist terminated the transfer. Menell
& Nimmer, supra note 40, at 3. This would be problematic because neither the artist nor the label would
have exclusive rights. However, this issue is best solved through negotiation, and in fact may provide
motivation to the parties to come to an agreement. “For this reason, [record companies], recording
artists, and other joint owners (such as record producers and recording engineers) will have incentives to
work together in exploiting works for which transfers of copyright have been terminated.” Id.
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Working Group offered, and the record industry may prefer to wear down the other
side with litigation, as it has attempted to do with online piracy.130
The response to such criticism is that labels and artists would participate because
it would be in their financial interest to do so. First, both artists and labels have too
much at stake to risk the expense and uncertainty of simply fighting all demands for
termination in court. For artists, it may be challenging to organize mass participation,131
and some might prefer to reacquire their rights on their own terms in order to most
creatively find new ways to exploit their work. However, most artists will find
themselves outmatched financially by their record companies and would benefit from
reduced transaction costs and fair terms negotiated on their behalf. And if a large
number of artists agreed to participate, record companies would be incentivized to
take advantage of this efficient and comparatively inexpensive vehicle for settling
artists’ termination claims
Moreover, record companies may find that favorable resolution in court cannot be
as easily achieved as they might hope for two reasons. First, as I have explained above,
their legal position is uncertain, particularly given the challenges posed by existing
case law on works made for hire and joint authorship. Though these issues have not
yet been tested in court with regard to terminations of sound recordings, a recent
decision in one closely watched case should give the record industry pause. In Scorpio
Music v. Willis, a federal district court in California is considering a music publisher’s
challenge to a termination demand from Victor Willis, the lead singer of the Village
People.132 In May 2012, the court denied the publisher’s motion to dismiss and held
that a joint author who transferred his portion of the copyright to a joint work may
terminate his transfer of rights to his portion of the joint work without the consent of
the other joint authors. This means, if Willis ultimately prevails, the publisher will
have only partial control of the works at issue. If this holding is extended to sound
recordings, it would mean that record companies would be hampered in their efforts
to efficiently exploit such works, even if they retain a portion of the control.
The derivative works exception is another example of how a non-negotiated
resolution runs the risk of ultimately stymieing efficient sound recording ownership.
If an artist successfully terminates his rights, the record company would still be able
to exploit derivative works created under the original transfer, but would effectively
have a non-exclusive right to do so because the label would have to compete with the
130. Record Industry Sues Hundreds of Internet Music Swappers, NYTimes.com (Sept. 8, 2003), http://www.

nytimes.com/2003/09/08/technology/08WIRE-MUSI.html.

131. Don Henley has suggested that artists may just be predisposed to shy from group action:

I know there’s been some talk of an industry-wide global settlement . . . . Of course,
artists being the bullheaded lot they are, many maybe wouldn’t want to join in that
settlement, and then what you got? It seems to me a majority, a great majority, would have
to buy into this in order for it to work. Anything that involves artists is a herding cats
situation. That’s one of [the] reasons, frankly, that artists have been so mistreated and
abused over so many decades in the recording industry––because they are not organized.

Rohter, supra note 61.

132. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-1557, 2012 WL 1598043 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
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artist, who would now controls the rights to the underlying work. The likely result
would undercut the work’s profitability for the label.133 Given the legal risks and
potential costs they may incur even if they win in court, it may be unwise for record
companies to blindly wage a litigation war against every termination request.
In addition, there is at least some precedent for industry-standard agreements
and cooperation in the music industry, albeit in the very different context of licensing.
Performing rights organizations have, for the most part, brought order and fairness
to what had previously been the inefficient, unwieldy licensing regimes that preceded
it, and some have proposed that the industry consider expanding the scope of
collective licensing.134 Others have imagined a PRO-like approach to resolving
termination claims.135
Ultimately, the potential benefits of a Working Group should be considered as
preferable to the much more costly and risky alternative of a protracted legal battle,
and more likely to meet the needs of consumers who seek efficient access to music at
a fair price.
VI. CONCLUSION

The rapid pace of technological innovation, a dynamic marketplace, and society’s
appropriate recognition of evolving forms of creativity challenge U.S. copyright law
to regularly evolve and readjust to ensure that the useful arts are being properly
promoted, as envisioned by the U.S. Constitution. In 1966, Benjamin Kaplan defined
the foundational goal of copyright law as designing “inducements to producers
calculated to maximize public satisfactions.”136
The termination right was designed to ensure that the inducements were properly
calculated by recognizing the impossibility of predicting how much value the public
might find in any given work of creativity. But as 2013 looms and copyright transfers
in sound recordings near their eligibility for termination, the issue of whether recording
artists will be able to successfully exercise their termination rights remains unresolved.
This note argued that, with regard to sound recordings, the goal of achieving
balance between the doctrinal underpinning of sound recording terminations and
carefully considered equitable concerns would be best served by a resolution that
preserves termination rights. Under current law, this can be achieved by judicial
recognition that most sound recordings are not works made for hire and separately by
creation of a Music Industry Working Group on Terminations to maximize efficiency
in administering sound recording terminations. Prospectively, legislative reforms to
the Act, such as the “key contributor” approach and legislative unitization, would
help resolve lingering ambiguities and result in predictability, fairness, and efficiency
133. Nimmer & Menell, supra note 43, at 415–16.
134. See, e.g., Whitney Broussard, The Promise and Peril of Collective Licensing, 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 21

(2009).

135. See Gould, supra note 1 at 94 (“Some organizations might aggregate termination claims on behalf of a

broader set of artists.”).

136. Kaplan, supra note 47, at 849.
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for all stakeholders. Most significantly, a market in which artists can exercise their
legal termination rights and disputes are settled without the high cost of extended
and uncertain litigation will serve the consumer by incentivizing the creation and
distribution of music at a reasonable price.
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